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This paper investigates the relationship between a bureaucracy and mass media 
industry, and its implications to corruption. We develop a bureaucratic model of 
corruption with mass media. A representative profit maximizing media firm seeks for 
corruption news to be printed and sold. Channels through which competition in media 
industry and press freedom affect equilibrium corruption in a bureaucracy are modeled. 
Different degrees of media freedom and competition affect production and employment 
decisions of media firms, and this in turn affects the effectiveness of media in 
monitoring corruption. Competition and freedom in media sector also have an influence 
on bureaucratic structure and consequently on equilibrium corruption.  We find that the 
degree of competition in media market plays a significant role in controlling corruption. 
Freedom of media also reduces corruption. Empirical results support these findings. 
Media competition appears to be a more important tool to combat corruption than press 
freedom. The corruption problem in Italy could be reduced to the level experienced by 
France if the competitiveness of its media industry was to be improved to the same 
level as that of United Kingdom.  
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The pace of growing attention paid to the study of corruption mirrors the pace of the 
increasing awareness of the economic and social consequences of corruption around 
the globe. Even though, there have been speculations as to whether corruption might 
be beneficial to development in some respects, it is now more of a consensus that 
corruption is socially undesirable and is harmful to development. The literature on the 
consequences of corruption gives insights into how damaging corruption can be to a 
society and an economy. The study of causes of corruption, on the other hand, seeks 
to find major determinants in the hope to offer answers to the persistence of 
corruption
1. This paper generally falls into the latter classification.  
 
There has recently been a consideration that mass media contributes a way to combat 
corruption. International organizations, such as the World Bank and Transparency 
International, regard media as one of the major solutions to curb corruption (see, e.g., 
Stapenhurst, 2000; Transparency International, 2003). They call for plurality of media, 
media freedom and competition. Nonetheless, the knowledge as to how effective 
media actually perform to combat corruption is still very limited, albeit growing. This 
paper gives a systematic understanding on the impact of mass media on bureaucratic 
corruption. It is the first attempt to formalize the idea of media competition and press 
freedom being tools to combat corruption. Moreover, it provides new empirical 
evidence on the effect of media competition on corruption.  
 
It is believed that mass media contribute to policy outcomes. It plays two major roles. 
First, mass media is the information provider to the voters in elections. It informs voters 
regarding policy platforms announced by politicians. Second, media monitors and 
reports on misbehaved government. This paper looks at the latter. We do not consider 
the information-providing role of media to voters. This is simply because a bureaucracy 
involves recruitment of public officials and delegation, but not elections. Monitoring is a 
natural role of media at the bureaucratic level.  
 
We develop a bureaucratic corruption model with a mass media industry to study the 
relationship between mass media, a bureaucracy and corruption. Bureaucratic model 
allows us to capture monitoring role of mass media. Besides, this approach permits us 
to deal explicitly with corruption at implementation level, rather than political corruption 
caused by high-level politicians or political parties. 
 
In our model, a profit maximizing media firm seeks for corruption news to be printed 
and sold. Channels through which competition in media industry and press freedom 
affect equilibrium corruption in a bureaucracy are modeled. Different degrees of media 
freedom and competition affect production and employment decisions of media firms, 
and this in turn affects the effectiveness of media in monitoring corruption. Competition 
                                                 
∗ The author is grateful to Toke Aidt and Unai Pascual for helpful comments and suggestions.  
 
1 See, Jain (2001) for an extensive review of the study of corruption. See, also Rose-Ackerman (1999) for 
causes and consequences of corruption.  
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and freedom in media sector also have an influence on bureaucratic structure and 
consequently on equilibrium corruption.  
 
We find that an intense competition in media industry and its freedom make the media 
more effective in finding corruption, and thus discourages bureaucrats from engaging in 
malfeasant behaviour. It is more difficult for a bureaucrat to gain from corruption and 
make it easier for him to lose the wage income if he is to be corrupt. The higher degree 
of media competition and press freedom, at the same time, induces government to 
choose a higher public wage to control corruption. This incurs a corrupt bureaucrat a 
higher potential forgone wage income in case he is captured. These effects together 
reduce corruption. Empirically, we find a strong and significant impact that competition 
in media industry has on the controlling of corruption. While others have found press 
freedom an important tool to combat corruption, our results suggest that media 
competition is economically more important than press freedom in terms of corruption 
reduction.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The literature related to this paper is discussed in 
section 2. Section 3 through 4 set up a model and offer theoretical explanations to the 
relationship between mass media and a bureaucracy, and its implication to corruption. 
We describe our empirical strategy and data in section 5, while section 6 presents the 
empirical results. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Related  Literature 
 
 
The idea that a key role of mass media is to inform the electorate is central to 
theoretical literature on mass media. There have been two theoretical approaches to 
modeling mass media. The first considers how media may affect distributive politics. In 
the context of electoral competition, Stromberg (2001) used probabilistic voting model 
to analyse how the media can affect the allocation of targeted resources. He analysed 
the effects of mass media on policy issues including corruption and the effect of media 
on effectiveness of lobby groups. The less access to media, the lower the share of 
informed voters, and thus the more we can expect government to set policies that are 
associated with higher rents and corruption.  
 
The second approach focuses on how political accountability with incomplete 
information can be affected by the media. Besley and Burgess (2002) adopted the 
political agency model, and specified the fraction of informed citizens as a function of 
the extent of media activity and the effort level chosen by the incumbent. A larger 
extent of media activity leads to higher proportion of informed citizens who will vote for 
the incumbent, and thus more effort chosen by him. In other words, the government 
has incentive to be more responsive if it faces a more informed electorate. Besley and 
Prat (2001) took the same approach; however, they added the possibility that the 
media may be captured by the government. They predicted that a higher degree of 
media plurality makes it less likely for media to be captured. Furthermore, they 
speculated that expected rents decrease, as media is more effective in receiving signal 
that the incumbent is bad. That is, more effective media should lead to less corruption. 
 
The literature has so far looked at the information-providing role of media. On the 
contrary, we stress the monitoring role of media, to which little attention has been 
given. The starting point is the bureaucratic model of corruption [see, e.g.,  Acemoglu 
and Verdier (2000); Ades and Di Tella (1999)]. Their model has antecedents in the   5
literature on the optimal model of corruption. A benevolent social planner is assumed to 
choose institutional variables to maximize social welfare. He delegates to bureaucrats 
to carry out some necessary activities with possibility that they may choose to collude 
and not report truthfully to the planner. Ades and Di Tella (1999) adopted this approach 
to study the relationship between competition and corruption. Acemoglu and Verdier 
(2000) demonstrate that corruption may persist as part of an optimally designed 
institution
2. We extend the bureaucratic model of corruption to include mass media 
industry in order to study its influence on a bureaucracy and corruption. 
 
The empirical literature has focused on the relationship between media and several 
outcomes. Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Ahrend (2002) relate press freedom and 
corruption in cross-country analysis. Both papers find that press freedom is 
assocciated with lower levels of corruption. Besley and Burgess (2002) look at 
evidence from Indian states, and find that state governments are more responsive to 
droughts and floods where newspaper circulation is higher. This is consistent with their 
theoretical results. Djankov et al (2001) focused on the effect of media ownership 
patterns on social and political outcomes. Their main finding is that state ownership of 
newspapers is negatively correlated with good government. They also obtained the 
result that level of corruption is associated with state ownership of newspapers. Using 
Djankov et al (2001) data on ownership of media, Besley and Prat (2001) looked at the 
effects of media ownership patterns on press freedom and corruption. Their finding is 
that greater state ownership implies less press freedom. They also find negative 
relationship between foreign ownership of media and corruption. In contrast to the 




3. The  Model 
 
 
A static economy consists of a continuum of polluting firms with mass 1 and a 
continuum of risk-neutral agents with mass 1. Two professions are offered to each 
agent: They can become government employees (bureaucrats) or reporters/journalists 
employed in media industry; or will be unemployed otherwise. Let n be the fraction of 
bureaucrats, and k be the fraction of agents who seek a job in media industry. A 
fraction r of k is employed as news reporter and a fraction u is unemployed. Thus, 
k u r = +   and  1 = + k n . We consider the situation where n and k are exogenously 
given; this is to say that there is no movement/allocation of workers between the two 
sectors. 
 
3.1.   Government, Bureaucrats, and Polluting Firms 
 
The government imposes an environmental penalty, denoted byτ , ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ τ , on 
polluting firms. A polluting firm has to pay a penalty if it is found to be operating illicitly. 
The government needs to employ some agents as bureaucrats to find polluting firms. 
For simplicity, we also assume that one bureaucrat is assigned to find one polluting 
firm. The fraction of polluting firms that is found by bureaucrats is h(n);  0 ) ( > ′ n h . 
Polluting firms that have been found by bureaucrats are unknown to the government.  
 
                                                 
2 See (Aidt, 2003) for a survey on models of optimal corruption and its theoretical discussions.   6
A bureaucrat can exploit the informational advantage he has over his principal, the 
government. He can collude with a polluting firm he has found and report untruthfully 
back to the principal, in which case the available maximum surplus that can be 
extracted is τ. Assume that the bureaucrats can get a proportion σ of this amount as 
bribe. If a bureaucrat cannot find a polluting firm, he has no choice but to report 
truthfully. The public sector wage, denoted by w, is the government tool to combat 
corruption. The government aims at reducing corruption as much as it can, knowing its 
budget constraint that the wage cost is to be financed by the income from the 
environmental penalty.  
 
There are two ways for the government to find out whether a bureaucrat is giving a 
truthful or false report. One is through its own internal monitoring mechanisms. Let g(e) 
be the probability that the government finds corruption, where e is exogenous 
institutional aspects of the monitoring technology, and  0 ) ( > ′ e g . g can be interpreted 
as the effectiveness of internal monitoring given the institutional aspects e.  
 
Another way to find out about corruption is to rely on the news printed by mass media. 
The role of mass media will be discussed in details in the subsequent section. Let q be 
the probability that corruption is captured by the mass media. We assume that 
corruption news printed by mass media is verifiable. That is, media print the news 
regarding false report by a bureaucrat, only if it has in fact occurred.  
 
Assume that there is a personal cost, m, associated with being dishonest, and that the 
personal cost is different across individual bureaucrats. The personal costs are 
distributed according to uniform distribution ) (⋅ F on  ] 1 , 0 [ . A bureaucrat decides whether 
he will make the collusion offer to a polluting firm. If he does not make the collusion 
offer, he is considered honest. He is considered corrupt otherwise.  
 
If honest, a bureaucrat obtains the wage w. If corrupt, he incurs the personal cost of 
being corrupt, m, and he will receive both the wage and the bribe  τ σ ⋅  with probability 
) 1 )( 1 ( g q − − in case of not being caught neither by the media nor by the government. If 
a corrupt bureaucrat is caught, he is fired and receives nothing. We can ensure that 
being honest is incentive compatible if 
 
(1)   m w g q w − ⋅ + − − ≥ ] )[ 1 )( 1 ( τ σ  
 
Equation (1) can be used to define the level of personal cost m  such that the 
bureaucrat withm  is indifferent between being corrupt and being honest. 
 
(2)     w qg g q qg g q m g q w m ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ + − − = = ) ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( τ σ  
 
Equation (2) establishes the determination of corruption level. The fraction of corrupt 
bureaucrats is therefore ) (m F . The government chooses the public wage to minimize 
the level of corruption subject to the budget constraint: 
 
(3)   n w n h m F ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ − τ ) ( )] ( 1 [     
 
Let the cost function be n w⋅ . It is beneficial to the government as raising public wage 
increases the fraction of honest bureaucrats. We assume that  n n h = ) ( . Substitute (2)   7
into the distribution function  ) (m F , we can express the probability that a bureaucrat is 
corrupt (or the fraction of corrupt bureaucrats) as 
 
(4)   m w qg g q qg g q F = ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ + − − } ) ( ) 1 {( τ σ  
 
 
3.2.   Media Firms 
 
 
We model mass media as a newspaper industry with a representative media firm. The 
newspaper firm seeks for verifiable corruption news to be printed, and attempts to 
make profits by selling the news. The newspaper devotes the fraction of its news 
space,s , per print to the corruption issue. The whole space per print of a newspaper is 




θ r A s ⋅ = ,   ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ , 
 
where  r is the number of reporters employed by the media firm and  A is an index of 
the firm productivity. Let
m w be the media sector wage. 
 
The degree to which the mass media permits free flow of information to and from the 
public identifies press freedom. To capture this, we assume that press freedom affects 
and increases media productivity. The media firm possesses 
productivity ] 1 , 0 [ ; ) ( ∈ = f f f A , where f reflects the degree of press freedom. Thus, 
the media firm technology becomes: 
 
(6)  
θ r f s ⋅ =  
 
The probability that a potential reader spots corruption news is s , which is the fraction 
of the corruption news space in the space of 1 per print. Revenue from selling 
newspaper withs corruption news is  
 
(7)  
γ s s R = ) (  
 
where  γ is an indicator of competition in the market for corruption news, such 
that ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ γ . A high γ implies that competition is intense
3. Denote 
m w as media wage. 
The media choose r to maximize its profits per print:  
 
(8)   r w R




                                                 
3 Equation (7) expresses the reduced form relationship between the competition in media market and the 
revenue from selling corruption news. We assume that the media firm faces the demand for corruption 
news:
1 − =
γ s p , where p is the price per unit of corruption news s. Assume that ρ γ 1 1 − = , where ρ is 
the elasticity of demand and  1 − > − ρ . We thus interpret γ as a measure of media market competition. 
Also, assume that  s p R ⋅ = .    8
3.3.   Media  Union 
 
 
Media union represents employees in media industry. The union model developed by 
Layard et al (1991) and the study by Aidt and Sena (2003) provide the basic of our 
media union model. Media wage is endogenised by allowing employees in media 
industry, the reporters, to form the media union and bargain over the salary with the 
employer. The union has k  members, r of which will be recruited to the media firm and 
u  of which will be unemployed. Note that  k u r = +  agents enter media industry.   
Assume that recruitment is undertaken in a random fashion, and thus the probability of 
obtaining a job in the firm for each agent is  k r . Unemployed members obtain 
homogenous income Q from the unemployment benefit system of the media union. The 
objective of the union is to maximize the expected wage income of the members: 
 







m ⋅ − + ⋅ = ) 1 (  
 
The media union and the media firm bargain over the wage only. We adopt the 
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to describe the outcome of the negotiation 
between the union and the firm. Assume that the firm’s fall back option yields zero 
profit, and the union members are completely unemployed (i.e. r = 0) and obtain Q in 
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where β is the bargaining power of the media firm and  β − 1 is that of the union. Note 
that the bargaining powers of both sides are exogenous. The union and the firm 
negotiate a wage contract that maximizes the Nash product.  
 
We can summarise the timing of events as follows. First, the government chooses the 
public wage to minimise corruption subject to equation (3). Second, the media unions 
and firms bargain over media wage rate and reach an agreement. Third, the media 






We analyse the model by backward induction.  
 
Stage 3: Suppose that a representative media firm chooses r that maximizes its profit. 
Thus, the reporters demand is determined by 
 
(11)   0
1 = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
∂ − m w r f
r
θγ γ γ θ
π
   9
 
and the demand function for reporters is 
 
(12)  


















w r  
 
It can be noticed that employment in the media firm is decreasing in 
m w . The profit 
function can be found by substituting the reporters demand function into the firm’s 
objective function and using the first order condition to simplify: 
 
 
(13)   ) (
1
) , ( ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅
⋅ −






The probability that media can transmit its corruption news to the public is equivalent to 
the probability that a dishonest bureaucrat is detected by media of taking bribe. The 
probability that a reader spots corruption news constitutes the probability that media 




















f r s q  
 
From the media firm decision, it can be seen that q  ands  are increasing in γ and f. 
That is, more intense competition in media industry and more media freedom induces 
each media firm to print more corruption news, and thus leads to a higher probability 
that a corrupt bureaucrat will be caught by media. This is a channel through which 
media competition influence corruption.  
 
 
Stage 2: The media union and the firm bargain over the media wage rate. The union 
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Using equation (10) and 












m , we get 
 
(16)   0
1
1
) )( 1 (
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m m m    10
 






















We notice that the media wage depends on the media market competition, but not 
directly on press freedom. From equation (17), 0 < ∂ ∂ γ
m w . The media wage is 
decreasing in media market competition. For given media wage and given 
employment, a higher degree of competition in media industry leaves the media firm 
with lower profits (see equation (13)). Accordingly, a lower rent is available to be 
shared by the firm and the union, and thus drives a negotiated media wage down.  
 
Thus, we can see another channel through which media competition influences the 
probability that the media detects corruption. This influence channel happens through 
media union’s wage negotiation and employment decision of the media firm. Note that γ 
increases  q through both of the two channels.
4 From (14) and (17), we summarize 






















f q  
 
Stage 1: the government chooses the public wage to minimize the level of corruption 
such that equation (3) holds. According to equation (2), it is obvious that the higher the 
public wage, the less the level of corruption. Given the structure of the benefit and cost 
of using public wage to reduce corruption, the government therefore does its best to 
control corruption by choosing the level of public wage that balances its budget. The 
problem of the government can be formally described as  
 
(19)   w qg g q qg g q m
w ) ( ) 1 ( min − + − + − − = στ  
 s.t.  
0




⋅ ≥ ⋅ ⋅ −
w
m
n w n m τ
 
  
 Substitute equation (2) into (3), we can rewrite the budget as 
 
(20)   w w qg g q qg g q = ⋅ − + + + − − − τ στ ] ) ( ) 1 ( 1 [  
 
 
                                                 
4 For certain values of parameters, q would not always increases with γ. In that case, we would find an 
inverted U-shape – q increases with γ  up to a point and decreases afterwards. We have no reasons to 
believe that the quadratic relationship between q and γ  should reveal in our model. For simplicity, we 
therefore exclude this possibility from our consideration.  
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The benefit and cost are increasing in public wage. From (20), The slope of the benefit 
function is always less than that of the cost function and the intercept term of the 
benefit function, 0 ) 1 ( 1 ≥ + − − − στ qg g q , is non-negative implying that the budget 
constraint is binding and 0 ≥ w  is satisfied.  
 


















Figure 1 illustrates the structure of benefit and cost function in term of public wage. The 
government chooses the public wage that satisfies equation (20). Solve equation (20) 
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Differentiate equation (21) with respect to q, we obatain 
 
 
(22)   0 ) 1 (
)] ( 1 [
















Proposition 1. The government minimizes corruption by choosing the budget-
balancing public wage given by (21). The public wage increases with the effectiveness 
of media sector in reporting corruption, as given by (22), indicating the complementarity 
between the public wage and the media effectiveness as corruption-combating 
instruments.  
 
An increase in media effectiveness is beneficial to the government. It increases the 
fraction of honest bureaucrats, thus increases the probability that the government 
makes higher profits from the penalty imposed on polluting firms. Media effectiveness 
affect the incentives of potential corrupt bureaucrats by making it less likely for a 
bureaucrat to gain from corruption, and more likely for him to lose his wage income.  
   12
From (14) and (17), we can see that 0 > ∂ ∂ γ q and . 0 > ∂ ∂ f q  This demonstrates that 
the government chooses higher public wage to achieve the lowest possible level of 
corruption, when the media industry experiences more intense competition and more 
press freedom, i.e.  0 > ∂ ∂ γ w  and 0 > ∂ ∂ f w . Geometrically, as media competition 
and press freedom increase, the intercept term and the slope of the benefit schedule 
increase. Thus, the government is allowed to choose a higher budget-balancing public 
wage to control corruption.   
 
Note that τ ∂ ∂w is ambiguous. A higher penalty provides adverse incentive for 
bureaucrats to be corrupt. This effect reduces the fraction of honest bureaucrats 
shifting the benefit schedule downwards – it is less profitable for government at any 
public wage level – allowing the government to choose a lower budget-balancing public 
wage. Nevertheless, a higher penalty, at the same time, is more profitable to the 
government for each polluting firm an honest bureaucrat captures. This effect allows 
the government to choose a higher public wage to balance its budget. All in all, the 
effect of penalty on public wage is ambiguous, and is dependent on parameters. Note 
also that 0 > ∂ ∂ g w . This effect works in the same way as the effect of q on w. 
 
 
4.1. Equilibrium Corruption  
 
 
The frequency of corruption is given by equation (4), and is restated here. 
 
 
(23)  ) , , , ( ] ) , ( ) , ( [ ] ) , ( ) , ( 1 [ g f w g f q g f q g f q g f q m
b a
τ γ γ γ τ σ γ γ ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ + − − = 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 42 1 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 42 1  
 







































It can be observed that  0 < ∂ ∂ γ a and 0 > ∂ ∂ γ b . The effects of higher media 
competition on m , which work through the probability that media detect a corrupt 
bureaucrat, q, will bring about a lower m and less corruption. According to (22), we 
saw that  0 > ∂ ∂ γ w . This effect also results in a lowerm and thus less corruption, as 
competition in media industry increases. The effect of press freedom onm is: 
 
(25)    
{ { {
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τ σ  
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The influence of press freedom on corruption is similar to that of media competition. 
The more intense media competition and press freedom, the higher probability that 
media catches corruption, and thus the lower equilibrium frequency of corruption. 
Intense competition and more freedom of press make it more difficult for a corrupt 
bureaucrat to gain from malfeasant behaviour and make it easier for him to lose the 
wage income. The higher degree of media competition and press freedom, at the same 
time, induce government to choose a higher public wage to control corruption, and 
these effects bring about less corruption.  
 
 
Proposition 2. The level of corruption decreases with a more intense competition in 
mass media industry and with a higher degree of press freedom, as given by (24) and 
(25) respectively.  
 
 
This result suggests that mass media can be accounted as an indirect tool to combat 
corruption. Other things being equal, an encouragement of competition and freedom in 
mass media industry should bring about less corruption.  
 
 
4.2. Additional Results 
 
 
Apart from the effects of media competition and press freedom on equilibrium level of 
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When the internal monitoring mechanism is effective, there tend to be less corruption. It 
is less likely for a corrupt bureaucrat to extract bribe (the first term in the bracket) and 
more likely that he has to forgo the wage income (the second term). Moreover, the last 
term in the bracket shows that a more effective government mechanism permits the 
government to raise its effort to control corruption by the public wage. A comparative 
static with respect to the level of environmental penalty is also worth considering. 
 

































The first term in the bracket of (23) shows positive sign. A higher penalty results in 
more corruption. A more stringent penalty provides adverse incentive for bureaucrats to 
engage in malfeasant behaviour due to a higher potential gain from corruption. 
However, setting higher penalty, in the second term, ambiguously affects the choice of 
government on public wage. Thus, the effect of penalty level on corruption remains 
ambiguous.  
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Government generally sets bureaucratic wages not only with the aim of controlling 
corruption. The extent to which media competition, press freedom, the government 
mechanism, and the penalty change may not directly affect the public wage chosen by 
the government. In which case, the effects of those factors on the choice of public 
wage are dominated by the other effects. Thus, a higher penalty always increases 
corruption. An intense competition in media industry, press freedom, and effective 
internal mechanism still decrease corruption.  
 
 
Proposition 3. If the government choice of public wage is independent of the change 
in the level of environmental penalty, then the level of corruption increases with a 
higher level of environmental penalty.  
 
 
The government faces the dilemma between maintaining a stringent (environmental) 
penalty and combating corruption. By using media competition and press freedom as a 
tool, the government can maintain a stringent penalty to achieve environmental 
outcomes without having to jeopardize combating corruption objective.  
 
 
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
We perform a numerical exercise to illustrate the interactions between variables and 
comparative statics of our interest. With certain fixed values of parameters that obey all 
restrictions set out in the preceding section, we provide an example of a relationship 
between media parameters (i.e. media competition and press freedom) and the public 
wage and the level of corruption.  
 
The numerical example fixed every parameter at certain values, while allowing the 
media competition or press freedom to vary between 0 and 1. Note that consistent 


























   





















Figure 2a and 2b shows the relationship between media competition and public wage, 
and media competition and corruption respectively. Both demonstrate these 
relationships with different values of government mechanism (g = 0.1,0.2, and 0.3). 
Figure 2a indicates that the government chooses higher public wage as media 
competition increases, while Figure 2b shows that, with other parameters fixed, media 
competition reduces corruption. At every value of media competition, the public wage is 
shifted higher and the level of corruption is shifted lower, with higher level of the 
effectiveness of government mechanism. Furthermore, it can be seen from Figure 2b 
that a decrease in the level of corruption is more sensitive to an increase in the 
effectiveness of government mechanism when media competition is more intense. A 
unit increase in g has a larger impact when media competition is high.  
 
Figure 3a and 3b shows the relationship between press freedom and public wage, and 
press freedom and corruption respectively. Figure 3a demonstrates that a higher level 
of press freedom leads government to choose a higher public wage. Figure 3b shows 
that corruption decreases with press freedom, given other parameters. We can see 
from Figure 3a and 3b that, at every value of press freedom, a more effective 
government mechanism bring about a higher public wage and consequently less 
corruption. However, the impact of the government mechanism on corruption seems to 
be independent of the degree of press freedom.  
 
It can be inferred from Figure 2 and 3 that the government and mass media monitoring 
capability support each other to allow higher public wage effort to reduce corruption. 
Moreover, when the government mechanism becomes more effective, its impact on 
corruption reduction gets larger, at any given value of media competition and press 
freedom. For instance, corruption falls to a larger extent when g rises from 0.2 to 0.3 
than when g increases from 0.1 to 0.2, measuring at any given value of either media 
competition or press freedom (see, Figure 2b and 3b).  
 
 Figure 3 
  
         (a)                                                                                    (b) 
 
The relationship between media competition and corruption with different values of the 
level of penalty and degrees of press freedom is demonstrated in Figure 4a and 4b 
respectively. Figure 4a shows that the effect of the level of penalty on corruption is 
dependent upon the degree of media competition. The extent to which a higher level of 
penalty causes more corruption is decreasing with the degree of media competition. In 












































effect of an increase in the level of penalty on corruption. It is shown in Figure 4b that 
press freedom helps media competition to better deal with corruption. The impact of 
press freedom on corruption increases with the degree of competition in media 
industry. That is, when media market is more competitive, a unit-increase in press 
freedom decreases corruption more relatively to the situation when media market lacks 
competition.  
 
 Figure 4 
 
 Note: t = the level of penalty, f = degree of press freedom 
 
       (a)                                                                                     (b) 
 
Figure 5a shows that, in contrast to Figure 4a, the effect of the level of penalty on 
corruption seems to be less dependent upon the degree of press freedom relatively to 
that of media competition. A higher level of penalty however results upward shift of the 
level of corruption. Figure 5b demonstrates that media competition complements press 
freedom to combat corruption, and the scale of its impact is larger when the degree of 




Note: t = the level of penalty, MC = media competition 
 
















































































MC =0.6  17
The analysis above yields a few hypotheses that will be tested in the following section. 
The model also demonstrates that changes in media industry may affect 
choice/behaviour of the government, and thus the structure of a bureaucracy. This is to 
say that media competition and press freedom not only improve the effectiveness of 
media in reporting corruption, but also have an influence on the change of bureaucratic 
structure. We expect to empirically observe lower level of corruption with more press 
freedom and more intense media competition (Proposition 2). Moreover, we should 





5. Empirical Strategy and Data   
 
 
This section examines consistency between empirical evidence and theoretical 
explanations obtained in the preceding sections. Testable implications will be analysed 
using both reduced-form and structural form regressions across countries. The model 
not only suggests relevant determinants of corruption, but also the structure of 
econometric model we will construct. The empirical work is primarily to find whether 
there exist systematic relationship between mass media industry and corruption. First, 
we run the following basic specification: 
 
(28)   i i i i i i i i i i i i e BS f COR ε α τ α α α γ α + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1  
   
i COR , index for corruption, is dependent variable in our regressions. Our primary 
explanatory variables include media competition, i γ , and press freedom i f . 
Bureaucratic structures, BSi, including the size of bureaucracy and the level of public 
wages also determine corruption. e is the vector of institutional variables of a 
bureaucracy that affect corruption. The level of penalty or stringency of regulation 
governments impose on private sector, i τ , is also taken into account. 
 
We use the press freedom index, PRFDM, from Freedom House for f. It measures the 
degree to which each system permits the free flow of information to and from the public 
determines the classification of each countries index. In compiling the survey, Freedom 
House measures the degree to which law and administrative decisions of the 
government influence the content of the news media, the degree of political influence 
or control over the content of the news system, the economic influences on the media 
exerted either by government or private entrepreneurs, and the degree of oppression of 
the news media exhibited in many forms. Press freedom index is available online from 
the Freedom House website
6, and is taken for the year 2000 in our analysis. We 
rescale the index so that the higher value means more free press.  
  
A proxy for media competition, MEDCOM, will be constructed by using an index of 
media competition and an index of ownership of press. The former is obtained from 
Kruckeberg and Tsetsura (2003) data on media competition. This data is originally from 
the Walden’s World of Information Business Intelligence Reports. This report gives us 
                                                 
5 Note that Proposition 1 will not be empirically examined. This is due to lack of data and theoretical 
ground on the public wage determination. Moreover, the study of the determinants of public wage is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
6 www.freedomhouse.org    18
the number of daily newspapers published in each country. The authors calculate the 
media competition index by dividing population number by the number of daily 
newspaper published in each country in 2000. This index will be combined and 
adjusted with data on media ownership constructed by Djankov et al (2001) for the year 
1999 to make our MEDCOM.   
 
As a proxy for corruption, we will use measures of corruption from different sources. 
First of which is the control of corruption measure, COR, from the Kuafman et al (2003) 
data set on governance. COR measures “the exercise of public power for private gain” 
in year 2000, and is a perception-based indicator. The higher the value, the less 
corrupt a country is. Second, we use the corruption perception index, CPI, which is 
developed by Transparency International. This index is constructed based on several 
other surveys on corruption. It assesses the degree to which public officials and 
politicians are believed to accept bribes, take illicit payment in public procurement, 
embezzle public funds, and commit similar offences. CPI  is available online and is 
taken for the year 2000
7. Note that higher score of COR and CPI means less corruption.  
 
Data on public wages, GOVWAGE, and the size of public sector, GOVSIZE, will be 
obtained from the World Bank online dataset on Public Sector Employment and Wage
8, 
which was initially constructed by Schiavo-Campo et al (1997). The data set is taken 
for the average between 1995 and 2000. GOVWAGE measures the ratio of average 
central government wage to per capita GDP. GOVSIZE measures the number of central 
civilian government as percentage of population (excluding health, education, and 
police). The data set used and constructed by Court, Kristen, and Weder (2000) on 
bureaucratic wage is also available for developing countries, and will also be used in 
our analysis. This data captures the relative wage of employees in public sector and 
private sector, and it extends the database that was previously developed and used by 
Rauch and Evans (2000).  
 
To capture institutional aspects of a bureaucracy, e, we use a dummy variable for 
industrial country, DEV, a dummy variable for legal origin, LEGAL, and an index of 
enthnolinguistic fractionalisation, ETHNO.  The three control variables are aimed at 
capturing structural and cultural differences in bureaucratic system across countries
9. 
DEV is proxied by membership of the OECD. LEGAL takes the value of 1 if a country’s 
legal origin is from a common law system and takes the value of 0 if it is developed 
from a civil law system. ETHNO  captures the cultural diversity within a society. It 
measures the probability that two random persons within a society would come from 
different linguistic backgrounds. LEGAL and ETHNO are taken from Treisman (2000) 
and initially compiled by La Porta et al (1998).  
 
The number of procedures, PRCD, data is used to capture the level of penalty or 
stringency of regulation governments impose on private sector, i τ , in our model. It 
measures the number of different procedures that a start-up firm has to comply with in 
order to obtain a legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity. This index is taken 
from Djankov et al (2002), which collected the information in 1999. The female 
                                                 
7 www.transparency.org  
 
8 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/cross.htm  
 
9 The dummy of industrialized countries (as membership of OECD) is expected to better capture structural 
and cultural differences in bureaucracy than the level of income (GDP).  
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education, FEMEDU, and the number of poplulation, POP, are used as instrumental 
variables in our model. The source of the number of population (millions) in 2000, POP, 
is the World Development Indicators 2001 (World Bank, 2001). The percentage of 
female tertiary school enrolment in 2000 is used as a proxy for female education, 
FEMEDU. The data is from the World Development Indicator 2004
10.  
 
The bureaucratic delays, BUREAUD, the regulatory burdens, REGBURD, and the 
regulations, REGULAT, are used to capture characteristics and relative performance of 
a bureaucracy. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Survey provides 
the ratings of REGBURD for the year 1997. It captures the degree to which government 
regulations impose a heavy burden on business competitiveness. Higher ratings 
means lower regulatory burden. REGULAT is from the Heritage Foundation, also for the 
year 1997. The index measures whether a license is required to operate a business 
and how easy it is to obtain such license. Higher score of REGULAT means more 
regulations. The data on REGBURD and REGULAT used in our paper are taken from 
Friedman  et al (2000)’s data set. BUREAUD is originally from the Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence’s Operation Risk Index. It is an indicator of bureaucratic 
delays (red tape). The data is the average of the years between 1972 and 1995, and is 
taken from La Porta et al (1998). Higher value of the index means less degree of 
bureaucratic delays.  
 
Other variables that are utilized in our analysis are also described here. An index of 
regulatory quality, REGQUA, are taken from Kuafman et al (2003). REGQUA includes 
measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by 
excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. Lack of 
political right and civil liberty, LACKPC, index is used in our work. This is a simple 
average of an index of political right and an index of civil liberty constructed by 
Freedom House. This index captures factors such as the right to vote, the right to 
organize political parties, fair elections, meaningful representation by elected 
representatives, freedom of assembly and demonstration, an independent judiaciary, 
and the absence of political terror and torture. Note that higher value of LACKPC 
means less of political right and civil liberty in a country. The measure of the extent to 
which the educational system meets the need of a competitive economy, EDUSYS, is 






There is a close relation between corruption and media competition across countries in 
our data set. Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of corruption and media competition. It 
shows a positive association between corruption score and media competition. That is, 
we observe lower corruption with higher media competition when no other factors are 
taken into account. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of OLS regressions. Standard errors are White-corrected 
to allow for the possibility of Heteroskedasticity. Regression 1 reports the results with 
COR as dependent variable and media competition and the controls as explanatory 
variables. The estimated coefficients in regression 1 show that corruption score is 
                                                 
10 http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/    20
increasing in the level of development and industrialisation
11. Countries that are 
developed originally from a common law system tend to perform better with less 
corruption. However, neither DEV nor LEGAL is statistically significant.  
 
 

























Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation enters negatively and significantly indicating that a 
more diverse society is relatively more prone to corruption problem. These findings are 
consistent with the results generally found in corruption literature [see, e.g. Treisman 
(2000); La Porta et al (1998)]. The number of procedures also enters negatively, as 
expected by Proposition 3, and is highly significant. This implies that a bureaucracy 
possessing more cumbersome procedures is likely to experience more corruption.  
 
Media competition is highly significant and enters positively in regression 1. A more 
intense competition in media industry brings about less corruption. As for economic 
significance, the coefficient on media competition equals 0.3, implying that a 1-point 
increase in media competition leads to a 0.3-point increase in the corruption score. 
Next, we add press freedom in regression 2. Media competition continues to be 
statistically significant, albeit at 10 percent level. Press freedom reduces corruption as 
it appears positive in regression 2, but is statistically insignificant. The results on other 




                                                 
11 Higher score means less corruption.   21
 

















































































Observations  43 43 41 41 
R
2  0.75 0.77 0.77 0.78 
Notes: OLS regression. Constants are not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis and are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. ***,**, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
To see the robustness of the results to a different measure of corruption, we adopt CPI 
as the dependent variable in regression 3 and 4. They are the re-estimations of the 
specifications employed for regression 1 and 2 respectively. Even though, the 
estimated coefficients for the media competition and press freedom in regression 3 and 
4 are somewhat larger than those in regression 1 and 2, their levels of significance are 
identical. Press freedom again does not appear to be statistically significant. Note that, 
for every explanatory variable, coefficients estimated with CPI are bigger than the ones 
estimated with COR
12. The degree of statistical significance of the number of procedure 
remains unchanged, whereas the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation becomes less 
significant.  
 
More importantly, Table 1 demonstrates the significance of media competition as a 
determining factor of corruption. With comparison to press freedom, media competition 
is more economically significant in terms of reducing corruption, although there seems 
to be a substituting interaction between the two variables. 
 
 
6.1.  Robustness Test 
 
As an additional test of robustness, Table 2 employs the two-stage least square 
technique (2SLS) in order to cope with the possibility of simultaneity problem. Besides, 
an alternative of corruption measure, CPI, is again utilized. We still find a significant 
relationship between media competition and corruption. Media competition consistently 
                                                 
12 This is likely to be because CPI is measured with the score between 1 and 10, while COR is measured 
between –2.5 and 2.5.    22
appears to be statistically significant throughout various specifications. The role of 
media competition in Table 2 is somewhat more important than the earlier findings in 
Table 1, when the same specifications are compared.  
 
 
Table 2: Corruption regression – Robustness Test 




































































































































































































Obs.  34 34 21 21 34 34 21 21 
R
2  0.75 0.85 0.75 0.81 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.80 
Notes: Constants are not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
***,**, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. The female tertiary school 
enrolment rate, and population variables are used as instruments for media competition in 2SLS. Over-
identifying restriction test is distributed as a χ




It may be argued that competition in media industry is also simultaneously determined 
by corruption. Rent seeking bureaucracy gains more by keeping media industry lack of 
market competition. In this situation, we may encounter endogeneity bias. To correct 
for simultaneity, regression 5 through 12 employ 2SLS estimates instrumenting for 
Media competition, MEDCOM, with the rate of female tertiary school enrolment, 
FEMEDU, and population, POP.  
 
                                                 
13 We ran the residuals from 2SLS regression on all of the predetermined variables in the model. The 
value is obtained by multiplying R
2 by the number of observations and is distributed as a χ
2 with j degree of 
freedom;  j equals the number of exogenous variables excluded from the model minus the number of 
endogenous variables included in the model.    23
Table A1, in Appendix A, reveals potential simultaneity problem we encounter between 
corruption and media competition measure. Table A2, on the other hand, assures that 
FEMEDU does not suffer from the reverse causation. The number of population in each 
country,  POP, is surely not influenced by corruption. Apart from the exogenous 
characteristic, there are reasons to believe that FEMEDU and POP may be used as 
instruments for MEDCOM. We believe that FEMEDU captures the extent to which 
people in each community are able or are allowed to voice and express their 
views/opinions. Also, we believe that the degree of media plurality should be influenced 
by the number of population, POP.  
 
The first stage regressions indicate that the instruments are good. A highly significant 
F-statistics from the first stage regressions also confirm that the instruments perform 
well. Our assumption for the instruments to be valid is that MEDCOM is the only 
channel through which FEMEDU and POP affect corruption. We tested this assumption 
using Hausman test for over-identifying restrictions. The test indicates that we are far 
from being able to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the exclusion restrictions. 
That is, we find no evidence that the FEMEDU and POP belong in the corruption 
regression. The statistics of the Hausman test for over-identifying restrictions are 
reported in Table 2, and the p-value are in parentheses.  
 
Our measure of media competition appears statistically significant throughout all 2SLS 
estimates. We add the ratio of government wage and per capita GDP and the size of 
central government in regression 7-8 and 11-12 to capture the possibilities of 
bureaucratic determinants of corruption. However, both variables are of no statistical 
significance. Public wage becomes significant when we use the Court, Kristen, and 
Weder (1999) data set that extends Rauch and Evans (2000) data set. The result is 
with less than 20 observations and is not reported here
14. A potential reason that the 
size of government is insignificant here is possibly because corruption measures do not 
capture the extent, but the perception of the likelihood of corruption. Table 2 confirms 
that our results are robust to the conclusion that media competition has a significant 
role to play in combating corruption. 
 
The coefficients estimated in regression 6 lead us to interesting observations
15. 
Measuring at average values of other variables, if a country with a complete lack of 
media competition (MEDCOM = 0) was to become one with highly competitive media 
industry (MEDCOM = 5), this could help reduce its corruption problem to such an extent 
that the corruption situation in Indonesia would improve to that in South Korea, 
Nigeria’s to South Africa’s, Brazil’s to Germany’s, and Italy’s to Finland’s
16. If Italy’s 
media market, with MEDCOM = 3.1, could be made to be highly competitive, e.g. with 
MEDCOM  = 5, the country’s corruption situation would be improved to the level of 
France. That is, corruption score would be improved from 0.89 to 1.46.  
 
 
                                                 
14 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) also find significant relationship between public wage and 
corruption. They suggest that higher relative wage reduce corruption in public sector. This result also 
occurred with Rauch and Evans (2000) data set. 
 
15 We select regression 6 to perform a cross-country comparison as it presents the highest value of R
2, 
and is corrected for potential simultaneity problem with the highly valid instrumental variables that pass the 
Hausman over-identifying restriction test. 
 
16 Finland is the least corrupt country and has the highest-ranking corruption score in 2000.    24
Also measuring at average values of other variables, if a country with minimum press 
freedom, PRFDM = 1, was to become one with maximum press freedom, PRFDM = 9.5, 
then this could reduce corruption, for example, in Brazil to the level of United Kingdom, 
and could improve the level of corruption in Nigeria, the most corrupt country in Africa, 
to that of Botswana, which is the least corrupt country in Africa. Furthermore, if press 
freedom in Saudi Arabia (PRFDM = 1) would be allowed to reach the level of 




6.2. Structural Regressions Analysis 
 
 
It is anticipated that media competition and press freedom not only affect the level of 
corruption directly, but also have bureaucratic structure as channels of influence. 
According to our model, media competition and press freedom affect public wage 
chosen by the government. The public wage in turn affects corruption
17. Nonetheless, it 
would be a trivial exercise relating national data on public wage to media competition 
and press freedom without theoretical grounds on the determination of public wage
18.  
 
The association between the structure of media industry and characteristics of a 
bureaucracy is more of our interest. It is, therefore, worth considering whether media 
industry has an impact, if at all, on bureaucratic structure, and whether the bureaucratic 
performance consequently works to determine the level of corruption. The bureaucratic 
delays, BUREAUD, the regulatory burdens, REGBURD, and the regulations, REGULAT, 
are used as proxies for the bureaucratic structure, BS, to capture characteristics and 
performance of bureaucracy. We therefore estimate the following specification: 
 
(29)  
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
f BS
e BS COR
ω τ α α γ α
η β β
+ + + =
+ + =
3 2 1
2 1  
 
We employ the two-stage least square estimator to see the structural relationships 
between media industry, bureaucratic structure, and the level of corruption. The 
bureaucratic delays, regulatory burdens, and regulations variables are determinants of 
corruption. They are in turn endogenously determined by media competition, press 
freedom, and the level of penalty. It can be argued that the level of penalty affects 
corruption through bureaucratic performance, as it has an influence on bureaucrats’ 
behaviour.   
 
Table 3 presents the results of the structural regressions. Model 1 and 2 show that 
media competition and press freedom have significant positive impact on the score of 
bureaucratic delays, even though media competition appears statistically insignificant 
in model 2. This shows potential interaction between the two variables as noted above. 
The bureaucratic delays in turn affect corruption highly significantly in the two models. 
As bureaucracy becomes more effective, less corruption occurs.  
 
                                                 
17 The issue of public wage as a determinant of corruption has been dealt with in the corruption literature 
[see, e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)]. The relationship between corruption and the size of 
government is studied, for example, by Fisman and Gatti (2000). Nevertheless, they did not capture the 
size of government by employment, but expenditure. 
 
18 The determination of public wage is beyond the scope of this paper.    25










































































































































2  0.51 0.54 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.26 























































































































2  0.64 0.67 0.23 0.37 0.25 0.26 
Obs.  40 40 25 25 32 32 
Notes: 2SLS regression. Constants are not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis and are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. ***,**, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. Over-
identifying restriction test is distributed as a χ
2 under the null hypothesis of instrument validity. 
 
 
Media competition also has positive association with the score of regulatory burdens 
(see, model 3 and 4). A more intense competition of media causes a higher quality of   26
government regulations. Media competition enters significantly at 10 percent level in 
both models, but press freedom appears to be insignificant in model 4. MEDCOM thus 
seems to have a larger influence, as compared to PRFDM, on corruption when the 
regulatory burdens act as a transmission. The results of the regulations variable exhibit 
similar to that of the regulatory burdens. The REGULAT appears to be a significant 
channel through which media competition affects corruption.  
 
We can see from model 4 and 6 that, as for economic significance, media competition 
continues to be more important than press freedom in terms of enhancing regulatory 
quality. A 1-point increase in media competition leads to a 0.412-point decrease in the 
regulatory burdens, while a 1-point increase in press freedom only leads to a 0.119-
point decrease in the regulatory burdens. A 1-point increase in media competition also 
brings about a 0.216-point improvement of the regulations, whereas the same 
magnitude increase in press freedom causes merely a 0.038-point improvement. 
Nonetheless, model 2 shows that press freedom is more important in terms of 
enhancing bureaucratic efficiency.  
 
All in all, the results provide suggestive evidence that changes in media industry have 
potential impact on bureaucratic structures which in turn act to determine the level of 
corruption. Note that we perform the over-identifying restrictions test, and cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of instrument validity at conventional levels for most models except 
for model 4 and 5. The problem seems to disappear when PRFDM is dropped from the 
model as an instrument. REGULAT does not perform well as a channel of influence on 
corruption of the level of penalty, and the instruments becomes valid when PRCD is 






This paper investigates the effects of mass media on corruption. Profit maximizing 
media firms seek for corruption news to be printed and sold. Channels through which 
competition in media industry and press freedom affect equilibrium corruption in a 
bureaucracy are modeled. Different degrees of media freedom and competition affect 
production and employment decisions of media firms, and this in turn affects the 
effectiveness of media in monitoring corruption. Even though, media competition and 
press freedom play different roles in media industry, both of them enhance the 
effectiveness of media in reporting corruption.  
 
The model suggests that an intense competition in media industry and its freedom 
make it more effective in finding corruption, and thus discourages bureaucrats from 
engaging in malfeasant behaviour. It is more difficult for a bureaucrat to gain from 
corruption and make it easier for him to lose the wage income. The higher degree of 
media competition and press freedom, at the same time, induces government to 
choose a higher public wage to control corruption. This incurs a corrupt bureaucrat a 
higher potential forgone wage income in case he is captured. These influences 
together reduce the likelihood of corruption.  
 
There may be constraints for government to use direct tools to combat corruption. Its 
budget may constrain the use of public wage. An obligation to achieve an 
environmental outcome may require the government to maintain a stringent 
environmental penalty, even though this gives adverse incentive for bureaucrats to   27
engage in corruption due to high potential gain from corruption. Government generally 
faces these dilemmas. This paper also demonstrates that media competition and press 
freedom can be used as indirect tools, or as complements to public wage, for 
government to control corruption.   
 
On the empirical side, we find a strong and significant impact that competition in media 
industry has on the reduction of corruption. While others have found press freedom an 
important tool to combat corruption, our results suggest that media competition is 
economically more important than press freedom in terms of corruption reduction. Even 
though the results are a good starting point for future empirical research on the 
relationship between media competition and corruption, they should be interpreted with 
care due to lack of comprehensive data on media competition and bureaucratic 
structure. This issue deserves more scrutiny when higher quality data becomes 
available. 
 
We suspect potential interaction between media competition and press freedom, and 
its joint implication to corruption. This opens to future research. The relationship 
between media industry and bureaucratic system also deserve more consideration 
both from theoretical and empirical aspects. Theoretically, endogenising the number of 
agents in bureaucracy and media industry (i.e. allowing for the allocation between the 
two sectors) might be one possible way to capture the interaction between the two 
sectors. All in all, our findings support the claim that competition in media industry 
reduces corruption. Policies aimed at making media market more competitive and free 
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Apendix A  
 
 
Table A1: 2SLS Media Competition – Heteroskedasticity Robust 
  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent: MEDCOM  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
























































2  0.49 0.49 0.48 
Dependent: COR     








































2  0.35 0.47 0.31 
Observations  43 43 43 
Notes: Constants are not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table A2: 2SLS Political Right and Civil Liberty – Heteroskedasticity Robust 
 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Dependent: FEMEDU  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 










































































2  0.61 0.62 0.70 
Dependent: COR     











































2  0.43 0.33 0.58 
Observations  34 34 37 
Notes: Constants are not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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 Table A3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  S.D.  Minimum  Maximum 
COR   82 0.38  1.19  -1.4 2.54 
MEDCOM  43 3.46  1.16  0  5 
PRFDM  80 6.02  2.31  1  9.5 
LACKPC  80 2.91  1.72  1  7 
GOVSIZE  51 2.02  1.94  0.1 11.2 
GOVWAGE  38 1.98  1.17  0.04 4.9 













PRCD  77 9.60  3.75  2  17 
ETHNO  82 37.73  30.17  0  90 




























Table A4: Correlation matrix 
COR  1                 
MEDCOM  0.63  1               
PRFDM  0.73  0.68  1              
LACKPC  -0.68  -0.61  -0.91  1             
GOVSIZE  0.38  0.17  0.27  -0.27  1            
GOVWAGE  -0.38  -0.10  -0.22  0.26  -0.36  1           
BUREAUD  0.86  0.50  0.65  -0.57  0.26  -0.42  1          
REGBURD  0.59  0.35  0.44  -0.58  0.05  -0.29  0.25  1         
PRCD  -0.69 -0.40 -0.48 0.46 -0.10 0.26 -0.63 -0.51  1             
ETHNO  -0.43 -0.18 -0.37 0.35 -0.34 0.38 -0.37 0.11 0.08  1           
CPI  0.98 0.62 0.70 -0.69 0.43 -0.39 0.85 0.59 -0.75  -0.48  1         
EDUSYS 
REGULAT 
REGQUA 
POP 
FEMEDU 
0.62 
-0.58 
0.81 
-0.23 
0.77 
0.35 
-0.25 
0.54 
-0.20 
0.69 
0.48 
-0.15 
0.70 
-0.09 
0.65 
-0.43 
0.16 
-0.72 
0.06 
-0.64 
0.26 
-0.21 
0.23 
-0.28 
0.38 
-0.05 
0.11 
-0.29 
0.62 
-0.37 
0.58 
-0.61 
0.77 
-0.31 
0.63 
0.42 
-0.29 
0.63 
-0.27 
0.53 
-0.55 
0.44 
-0.56 
0.18 
-0.59 
-0.16 
0.15 
0.43 
0.35 
-0.39 
0.62 
-0.58 
0.84 
-0.28 
0.74 
1 
-0.44 
0.64 
-0.23 
0.49 
 
1 
-0.55 
0.08 
-0.35 
 
 
1 
-0.25 
0.62 
 
 
 
1 
-0.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 